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ABSTRACT
The minimax concept for solution of discrete two-person games is based on
expected value considerations and has a zero-sum condition for payoffs. This
approach often is inapplicable due to strong violation of the zero-sum condition.
By use of a different criterion, based on median value considerations, a two-
person game theory can be developed that seems appropriate for a class of situa-
tions called competitive. It is also applicable for a hugely broader class of
practically important situations called median competitive. Consider cases where
each player is either protective toward himself or vindictive toward the other
player. A largest value P I ( PII ) occurs in the payoff matrix for protective
player I (II) such that he can assure himself at least this payoff with prob-
ability at least 50 percent. A smallest value PI (PI I ) occurs in the matrix
for player I (II) such that vindictive player II (I) can assure, with probability
at least 50 percent, that player I (II) receives at most this payoff. For com-
petitive and median competitive games, a player is simultaneously protective and
vindictive. Values of P I, P
	 PI I, and median optimum strategies are
nearly always determined without great effort. This can be done by solution of
zero-sum games (expected value basis) with identified payoff matrices containing
only ones and zeroes. Deciding on payoff values is simplified for the median
approach. Except for P I, PII , P I, and PI I it is sufficient to know the relative
order of the values for each payoff matrix. The median approach has the strong
practical advantage of being applicable even when payoffs in different matrices
cannot meaningfully be added or subtracted (such as when only relative ordering
is known for one or both matrices).
This research was aided by valuable comments from John P. Mayberry.
Research associated with ONR contract N00014-68-A-0515. Based on
methods developed under NASA Grant NGR 44-007-028.
Research performed under ONR contract N00014-68-C-0379.
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INTRODUCTION AND DISCUSSION
This paper presents a form of discrete two-person game theory that
is based on median value considerations (motivated by the median estimation 	
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concept in statistics). Two extreme situations arise, depending on whether
a player is acting protectively for himself or vindictively towards the
other player. A protective player is interested in the largest payoff
such that he can assure himself at least this value with a probability
of at least 50 percent. A vindictive player is interested in the smallest
payoff such that he can assure, with a probability of at least 50 percent,
that the other player receives at most this value. A class of "Median
Optimum" strategies can be defined, for either the protective or vindictive
approach.
For a class of games called "competitive" (also for a much broader
class called "median competitive ,, ), there exist strategies which are
simultaneously median optimum from the protective viewpoint and from the
vindictive viewpoint. Consequently, for those games, identification of a
median optimum strategy as protective or vindictive is unnecessary. In
spite of certain parallels between the median-optimum viewpoint and the
minimax viewpoint, a pure strategy may be median optimum without necessarily
	 '	 I
being a minimax strategy.
The first introductory material outlines the median approach and some
of its properties. Then, some comparisons are made with the standard
minimax form of two-person game theory.
	 f
Each player has a separate matrix that states the payoff he receives
for each combination of a pure strategy of his with a pure strategy of
the other player. Both of these matrices are considered to be known to
	 }
I
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each player. The pair of payoffs to the players that occurs for a given
combination of a pure strategy for each player is an outcome of the game.
The first value in an outcome is the payoff to player I and the second
value is the payoff to player II.
Each player then imposes a preference-ordering on the outcomes. The
preference-ordering of a protective player I is considered to be such that
his own payoffs are nondecreasing and, by convention, the preference-ordering
of the protective player II is such that his own payoffs are nonincreasing.
I
In contrast, a vindictive player I imposes an ordering such that the payoffs
to player II are nonincreasing, and a vindictive player II imposes an
ordering where the payoffs to player I are nondecreasing. If there are
tied vali!es among the payoffs considered, there may be many alternative
orderings satisfying any one of those conditions. A vindictive player could
order within ties so as to be as advantageous to himself as possible. A
protective player could order within ties so as to be as disadvantageous
to the other player as possible. On the other hand, a protective player
could order within ties so as to be as advantageous to the other player as
possible, etc. Finally, more than one outcome could possibly have the
same pair of payoffs. A player may select among the possible orderings
of such "double ties" on the basis of the strategy combinations correspond-
ing to these outcomes. In all cases, each player (identified as protective
or vindictive) chooses a sequence that is called his preferred sequence.
The preferred sequences provide the basis for application of the median
approach.
A game is said to be competitive if the outcomes can be sequence
ordered so that the payoffs for player I are nondecreasing and the payoffs
4
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for player II are nonincreasing. The possible ordering of outcomes is
unique when the payoffs of player I are strictly increasing or those of
player II are strictly decreasing; then we assume that the preference
orderings of the two players are the same. However, more than one eligible
sequence order is possible when ties in payoff value occur for both players.
That is, the same outcome value could possibly occur for more than one
combination of strategies. Among these sequences (which are the same
in values of outcomes), each player selects his preferred sequence on the
basis of the strategy combinations corresponding to the pertinent tied
outcomes and from related probability considerations. If the preferred
sequence is still not unique, it can be chosen arbitrarily.
A largest payoff PI (PII) occurs in the matrix for player I (II) such
that he can assure at least this value with a probability of at least 50 per-
cent. A smallest' payoff PI (PI I ) occurs in the matrix for player I (II)
such that player I (II) receives at most this amount.
Let us consider determination of PI (PII) for a protective player
I (II). There exists a subset of outcomes in the preferred sequence for
protective player I (II) that consists of a determined outcome and all
outcomes above (below) it. Occurrence of an outcome in this identified
subset can be assured with a probability of at least 50 percent, but such
is not the case when the determined outcome is removed. A protective player
is considered to select his preferred sequence so as to minimize the number
of outcomes in the identified subset. When more than one eligible subset
has the minimum number of outcomes, a subset that has the highest assured
probability is used for the preferred sequence. The value of PI (PII)
is the payoff for player I (II) in the lowest (highest) outcome of his
i
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identified subset. Incidentally, one or more outcomes consecutively
adjacent to the identified subset could also have payoff PI (PII) for
player I (II).
Now, consider determination of the payoff PI I
 (PI), in the
other player's matrix, that is associated with a vindictive player I (II).
There exists a subset of outcomes in the preferred sequence for vindic-
tive player I (II) that is identified in the same way as was given for
evaluating P I
 and P II . The value of PI I (PI) is the payoff to player
II (I) in the lowest (highest) outcome of the identified subset for player
II (I) .
Detailed statement of results for the general case occurs in the
next section. However, some additional information about results for
competitive games is given here. When each player has a pure median
optimum strategy, player I (II) can guarantee (100 percent probability) at
least PI - 
P I (pII - pII), When player I (II) has a pure median optimum
strategy but player II (I) does not, player I (II) can guarantee at least
PI (PII), and player II (I) can assure at least PI I (Pi) with a probability
greater than 50 percent. When neither player has a pure median optimum
strategy, • player I (II) can assure that he receives at least PI (pII)
with probability at least 50 percent, and that player II (I) receives at
most PI I
 (PI) with probability at least 50 percent.
It is instructive to consider some characteristics of the median
of a probability distribution for a situation where both players use mixed
strategies. The median value of a distribution is not necessarily unique.
That is, all the permissible values in an extensive interval can be medians
of a probability distribution. This property can be convenient. Suppose
6that the game is competitive and consider the set of median values for
player I (II). Also, suppose that both players use mixed strategies that
are optimum for the median approach. Then, all payoffs that are at
least equal to PI ( pIi) and at most equal to PI (PII) are medians of the
probability distribution of the payoff to player I (II). Thus, as would b--
expected in competitive situations, player I (II) seeks to maximize the
upper payoff PI (PII) in his set of median values and to minimize the lower
payoff PI T. ( PI) in the set of median values for player II (I). The properties
of a median allow this to be done simultaneously in such a way that P
I	 II
(p )
and P1 (pI i ) can be far apart in an ordering of the payoff values for
player I (II). It is thus possible for P I
 to be in the upper payoff
values for player I simultaneously with P II being in the upper values for
player II. In fact, this seems to occur for many kinds of combinations of
payoff matrices for players I and II in competitive games.
Required information about payoff matrices is not very great when
the median approach is used. It is sufficient to first determine the rela-
tive order (includes equality) of the values for each matrix, which
determines the locations of 
PI' pI, PII, and PI I . Deciding on values
for 
P I , PI, 
PII, and PI I
 completes the .i.nformation that is required
about the payoff matrices.
It is more difficult to determine the appropriateness of the median
approach when the game is :iot even roughly of a competitive nature.
Then, a low payoff for one player does not necessarily correspond to a
high payoff for the other. Thus, the median payoff, say to player I,
might be substantially different for the protective and vindictive situa-
tions. Also, cases where cooperation would increase the payoff to both
^I
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players can occur. However, the median approach can be useful when
the players are not allowed to communicate (so that a player only knows
his own payoff matrix). Also, results like those developed for competitive
games can be obtained for a rather broad class of situations that are
termed median competitive.
The most general form of median competitive games, and corresponding
properties, have not been determined yet and provide a subject for future
investigation. An example of games that are median competitive, but not
necessarily competitive, is given here. The example consists of all
games that "generate" competitive games. A game is said to generate
a competitive game if, for both players, there exist sequences that are
eligible to be preferred sequences and for which the following two condi-
tions are satisfied: First, the payoffs of player I (II) that are in outcomes
above (below) the outcome determining PI (PII) are at least (most) equal to
PI ( PII ), and the payoffs in outcomes below this outcome are at most (least)
equal to PI (PII). Second, the payoffs of player I (II) that are below
(above) the outcome determining P I (PI I ) are at least (most) equal to
PI (PI I ), and the payoffs in outcomes below this outcome are at most
(least) equal to PI (PI I ). Then, new outcomes can be formed, by pairing
the payoffs of player I with those of player II, that satisfy the requirements
for a competitive game but leave the outcomes that determined 
PI' PII' PI'
PI I fixed and at the sane sequence positions. This is done so that the
groups of payoffs (without regard to order) in the identified subsets for
.	 t
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the competitive game are the same as the groups in these subsets for the
original game. Since the results developed depend only on the outcomes
that determine PIl 
PII y P II 
PII and on the groups of payoffs in the
8identified subsets, the results for this competitive game also apply to
the game from which it was generated.
Perhaps the most attractive feature of the median approach is its
ability to handle competitive and median competitive games where payoffs
from different matrices cannot be meaningfully added or subtracted. This
permits use of a game theory approach for an important and extensive class
of Situations. In fact, many of the situations occurring in economics and
the social science areas (psychology, education, etc.) have matrices of
this kind, maybe due to the fact that only relative order can be determined
within a payoff matrix. However, situations of this class occur in virtually
all areas where game theory is potentially useful (including military appli-
cations).
Now let us compare the median approach with the minimax procedure
where a zero-sum condition is imposed on the two payoff matrices and the
criterion is the expected value of the payoff to player I. Discus^ion of
expected value and median value properties occurs first.
The outcome that results when one or both players use a mixed
strategy is a random value. This outcome can be identified by a repre-
sentative property of its probability distribution. The mean of this
distribution (expected value of the random outcome) is one representative
property that could be considered. The distribution median (not necessarily
unique) is another representative property that is useful. Each of these
properties has desirable and undesirable features. Neither has been shown
to be uniformly preferable to the other. The median is especially appropriate
when there is not much interest in the extensiveness of distribution tails.
The mean can be preferred when large deviations from the central part of the
i
i
i
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distribution are important, even though their probability of occurrence is
very small. Often, choice of whether to consider the expected value or the
median value is based on the utility and convenience aspects of the situation.
If, for the situation considered, useful and much more extensive results can
be obtained for the median, statisticians seldom hesitate to consider it
rather than the distribution mean.
Discrete two-person game theory is a case where median considerations
seem to lead to more extensive results of a worthwhile nature than do
expected value considerations. The median approach is applicable for the
rather broad class of competitive and median competitive games, including
games where one or both payoff matrices have ordinal numbers. The
minimax approach required cardinal numbers in both matrices but still
only applies to the small subclass of competitive games where the matrices
at least roughly satisfy a zero-sum condition. Values must be determined
for all (or nearly all) of the outcomes when the minimax approach is used.
Except for a few payoffs (usually four, and never more than four) only
relative order among the payoffs in each matrix must be determined for
the median approach.
For games of a zero-sum type, it would seem that a combined use
of the expected value c-iterion and the; median approach could be desirable.
That is, the strategy used by a player is at least approximately optimum
in an expected value sense and :Also assures at least an identified payoff
with a probability that has a lower bound not greatly below 5G a,.:^rcent.
The resulting median payment would ordinarily be less than P I for player
I and less than PII for player II. Such strategies are especially desirable
when values of payoffs are only roughly known but relative ordering is
1,I
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precisely known within each matrix. The determination of strategies with
these combined properties is another subject for future investigation.
Payoff values that represent "catastrophe" can appear in a payoff
matrix. A modification of the median approach is needed to avoid the
occurrence of such extreme payoffs. One possible method is to not use
any row that contains a catastrophic payoff. The usual median approach
would be applied to the payoff matrices resulting when these rows (columns
in the matrix for the other player) are removed. However, further investi-
gatiuns to obtain suitable modifications would seem to be needed.
Only discrete games are considered here. However, extension of the
median approach to continuous cases, and combinations of continuous and
discrete cases, seems definitely possible and worthwhile. This extension
is a further subject for future investigation.
The next section contains statements of how to determine P I, PI,
PII , PI I , and optimum strategies for each player. Also, properties of
results using the median approach are stated more precisely. The final
section contains the basis for the results (in terms of three theorems).
10
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RESULTS
Let the payoff matrix for player I (II) be stated so that rows
represent pure strategies for player I (II) and columns are pure strategies
for player II (I). For all applications, a marking of some of the values
in the payoff matrices is made initially, with this being done separately
for each matrix. The case of a protective player is considered first.
For protective player I (II), first mark the position, in his matrix,
of his payoff in the last (first) outcome of his preferred sequence of out-
comes. Then do this for the next to the last (first) outcome for player
I (II), etc. Continue consecutively in his (protective) preferred sequence
of outcomes until the first time that this player can assure obtaining a
marked value with probability at least 1/2. The value of PI (PII) is the
last payoff marked in the matrix for player I (II). For competitive games,
PI (PI I ) is the payoff to player I (II) in the last outcome that was marked
in the matrix of player II (I).
Determination of P I (PII ), and the corresponding pairs, is perhaps
best accomplished by initially marking the matrix for player I (II) until
the first time that two or fewer rows contain marks in all the columns.
(The value of PI (PII) is greater than or equal to the last payoff marked
in this manner, and can be greater; based on Theorem 1.) Next, working
forward (backward) in the preferred sequence for protective player I (II),
remove the mark from the payoff (unique) that was marked last. 'Then,
replace the remaining marked values with ones and replace all other
payoffs in the matrix by zeroes. Consider this matrix of ones and zeroes
to be for a zero-sum game with an expected value basis. Solve for the
IM
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value of the game. If this game-value is less than 1/2, the marking is
completed by again marking the payoff whose mark was removed (which
also determines the corresponding outcome). If the game-value is at
least 1/2, continue in the same way (removing the mark from the last
payoff that was considered among those still marked, forming a matrix with
ones and zeroes, etc.). If the resulting game-value is less than 1/2 the
payoff whose mark was last removed is marked again and the marking is
completed. This marking procedure is continued until a game-value less
than 1/2 occurs. (This procedure, and that in the next paragraph, are
based on Theorem 2.) From examples, it seems that P I
 and PII are often
the payoffs that resulted in the first time that two or fewer rows contain
marked values in all columns of the respective matrices.
The zero-sum game (matrix of ones and zeroes) that occurs for the
final marking in evaluating P I
 or PII is also used to determine (protective)
median optimum strategies for the player with that matrix. That is, an
optimum strategy of this player for that game is also a median optimum
strategy. In particular, consider the situation for player I (II) when
PI (PII ) happens to be the payoff whose marking resulted in a pair of
rows that contain marked values in all columns (but no fully marked row
occurs). Examination of the zero-sum game shows that a mixed median
optimum strategy for player I (II) consists in choosing one of the rows
of this pair with probability 1/2 for each row.
For player I (II) vindictive, first mark the position in the matrix
for player II (I) that is in the last (first) outcome of the preferred
sequence of player I (II). Then do this for the next to last (first)
1	 .
outcome for player I (II). Continue consecutively in the (vindictive)
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preferred sequence for player 1 (II) until the first time that he can
assure obtaining a marked value :in the matrix of player 11 (1) with
probability at least 1/2. The value of P1 1 (PI) is the last payoff
marked in the matrix for player lI (1).
Determination of P 	 can be accomplished by initially marking
the matrix for player 11 (1), according to the vindictive preferred
sequence for player I (II), until the first time that two columns contain
marks in all the rows. Next-, remove the mark from the payoff that was
marked last. Replace the remaining marked values with ones and all
other payoffs by zeroes. Consider the resulting matrix to be for a zero-
sum game and solve for the game-value. If this game-value is greater
than 1/2, the marking is completed by again marking the payoff whose
mark was removed. If the game-value is at most 1/2, continue in the
same way with removal of another mark. If the resulting game-value
is greater than 1/2, again mark the payoff whose mark was last removed
and the marking is completed. This marking procedure is continued until
a game-value greater than 1/2 occurs. As for the protective case, it
seems that PZ and P1 T are often the payoffs that resulted the first
time that two or fewer columns contained marked values in all rows.
The zero-sum game that occurs for the final marking of the matrix
for player II (I) can be used to determine (vindictive) median optimum
strategies for player 1 (11). That is, an optimum strategy of player I (I1)
for this game, that is based on the matrix for player II (I), is also a
median optimum strategy. When P 	 happens to be the payoff that
resulted in a pair of columns with marks in all rows (but no fully marked
	 i
column occurs), a mixed median optimum strategy for player I (II) consists
14
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in selecting one of these two columns with probability 1/2 for each
column.
Statement of results occurs next. Cases where pure median optimum
i
I
strategies occur are considered first. In all cases, a protective player
I (II) can guarantee himself at least PI (PII) by using the fully marked
row in his matrix. A vindictive player I (II) can always guarantee that
player II (I) receives at most PI I ( P I ) by using the fully marked column
in the matrix for player II (I).
Now, consider the case where each player has a pure median optimum
strategy. When a protective player I (II) uses the fully marked row in
his matrix and a vindictive player II (I) uses the fully marked column
in the matrix for player I (II), player I (II) receives exactly P I = PT-
(P = PI I ) and player II (I) receives the payoff in his matrix that
corresponds to the strategy combination for this row and column. When
protective players I and II both use fully marked rows, player I sometimes
receives more than P I
 and/or player II sometimes receives more than PII.
When vindictive players I and II both use fully marked columns (in the
other player's matrix), player I sometimes receives less than PI and/or
player II sometimes receives less than PI I/ When the game is competitive
and each player has a pure median optimum strategy, P I = PI and P
II = PII;
also, when each player uses his pure median optimum strategy, player I (II)
receives PI (PII).
Now, consider the case where a pure median optimum strategy occurs
for player I (II) but not for player II (I). First, suppose that player
I (II) is protective. Then, player I (II) can guarantee himself at least
PI (PII ), and a protective player II (I) can assure himself at least
t0
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PII (PI ) with a probability of at least 1/2. Player I (II) can also
guarantee himself at least PI (PII) against a vindictive player II (I),
and player II (I) can assure that player I (II) receives at most P = pj
I	 I
(PII - PI I) with a probability greater than 1/2 (Theorem 3). Next, suppose
that player I (II) is vindictive. Then, player I (II) can guarantee that a
protective player II (I) receives at most PII = PII (P I = PI ), and player
II (I) can assure himself at least PII (P I ) with a probability greater than
1/2 (Theorem 3). Player I (II) can also guarantee that vindictive player
II (I) receives at most PI I (PI), and player II (I) can assure, with
probability at least 1/2, that player I (II) receives at most P (p'II ).
I 
Now consider competitive games. Then, PI = 
P I and PII = PII (Theorem 3).
Player I (II) can guarantee that he receives at least PI 
(p Ii ) and that
player II (I) receives at most P
II (PI)' player II (I) can assure that
he receives at least PII (PI) and also that player I (II) receives at
most PI (PII), with a probability greater than 1/2.
Finally, consider the case where no pure median optimum strategy
occurs for either player. Suppose that both players are protective. Then,
player I (II) can assure at least P I
 (PII ) with a probability of at least
1/2. When player I (II) is protective and player II (I) is vindictive,
player I (II) can assure that he receives at least PI (PII) with proba-
bility at least 1/2 and player II (I) can assure that player I (II)
receives at most 
PI (PII) with probability at least 1/2; these proba-
bilities are exactly 1/2 when both players use mixed median optimum
strategies. Next, suppose that both players are vindictive. Then,
player I (II) can assure that player II (I) receives at most P'
II 
(pI')
with a probability of at least 1/2. Now consider competitive games.
A
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Player I (11) can simultaneously assure, with probability at least 1/2,
that he receives at least PI 
(PII) and that player II (I) receives at
most P` ( pI ). When both players use mixed median optimum strategies,
1I	 .
player I (II) receives at least PI (PII) with probability exactly 1/2
and at most PI (PI I ) with probability exactly 1/2.
1^
I^
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BASIS FOR RESULTS
i
The procedure for determining P I , PI I , and vindictive median optimum
strategies can, with suitable interpretation be obtained directly from
that for determining P
i , PII, and protective median optimum strategies.
Hence, verification for the protective case is sufficient.
The results for both players protective, or both vindictive, can
be directly verified from the properties of the procedures for determining
P I , PII , P I , and PI I . This is also the case for one player protective
and the other vindictive when both players have pure median optimum
strategies or neither player has a pure median optimum strategy.
A competitive game can be considered to be a combination of the
situation where player I is protective and player II vindictive with the
situation where player I is vindictive and player II protective. Thus, to
verify properties of competitive games, it is sufficient to present proof
for the pertinent case(s) of one player protective and the other vindictive.
Finally, it is to be noted that competitive players can have different
preferred sequences in the sense of different combinations of strategies
being associated with outcomes that have the same value. However, this
causes no difficulties in derivations since the preferred sequences are
the same with respect to the values of the outcomes.
The following three theorems contain the verification that is not
evident from the properties of the .procedures for determining 
PI' PII,
PI , and P,',.
Theorem 1.	 The procedure of marking payoffs (in his matrix) for a
player until the first time that two or fewer rows contain marked values
i18 3
in all columns guarantees that occurrence of a marked value can be
assured with a probability of at least 1/2.
Proof:	 First note that continued marking ultimately results in
this situation. When one row becomes fully marked, the probability is
unity that some one of the warked values can be assured by the player.
Next, suppose that a pair of rows is needed. When two mixed
strategies p l , ..., pr
 and ql, ..., qs are used (pure strategies are
special cases, and there are r rows and s columns), the probability
of the marked subset is
r
i=1 piQi
where Qi
 is the sum of the q's for columns that have marked payoffs in
the i-th row. The largest value of this probability that the player can
assure (by choice of p l , ..., pr ) is
min
G = ql, ... , qs
Let i(1) and i(2) denote the two rows
in all columns. For any minimizing s,
at most G , so that
(max i Qi ) .
that together contain marked payoffs
at of q' s I both Q, (1) and Qi(2)  are
2G ^! Qi (1) + Qi (2) z 1 ,
and a probability of at least 1/2 can be assured. This probability can
exceed 1/2 but is exactly 1/2 when the unmarked payoffs are such that
two columns contain unmarked payoffs in all rows (since analogously, the
19
set of unmarked payoffs can be assured with a probability of at least
1/2). It is also exactly 1/2 when there are two columns that have an
unmarked payoff in row i(1) or row i(2) and are such that no row of the
matrix has payoffs marked in both columns.
Theorem 2.	 A lower bound on the probability that a player can
assure one of a specified subset of outcomes, and corresponding optimum
strategies, can be determined by solution of a zero-sum game with an
expected value basis. The payoff matrix for this game has ones at the
positions that correspond to the (pure) strategy combinations for the
subset of outcomes, and zeroes elsewhere. 1
Proof:	 Let each player use an arbitrary mixed strategy (a pure
strategy occurs as a special case). The expression for the expected pay-
1
off of the zero-sum game is also the expression for the probability that
some one of the outcomes in the specified subset occurs.
Theorem 3.	 When protective player I (II) has a fully marked row
in his matrix, but vindictive player II (I) does not have a fully marked
column in this matrix, PI = P I
 (P 	 PI I ); also, player II (I) can assure
that player I (II) receives at most PI (PI I ) with a probability greater
than 1/2. Likewise, when vindictive player I (II) has a fully marked
column in the matrix for protective player II (I), but player II (I) does
not have a fully, marked row in this matrix,PII = 
PII (PI - PI )i also
player I (II) can assure himself at least PI (PII) with a probability
greater than 1/2.
Proof: Consider the outcome that corresponds to the last payoff
marked for protective player I (II) and the outcomes that do not correspond
to marked payoffs for player I (II). This set of outcomes can be assured
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with probability greater than 1/2 by vindictive player II (I). Otherwise,
player I (II) would have terminated his marking procedure earlier. The
payoffs for player I (II) in this set of outcomes are at most equal to
PI (PI I ), with equality holding for the outcome corresponding to the
last payoff marked for player I (II). This follows from the development
of preferred sequences for competitive games. Also, since player I (II)
has a fully marked row in his matrix, player II (I) cannot assure that
player I (II) receives any payoff less than PI with nonzero probability.
Thus, PI = P I
 (PII = PII) and player II (I) can assure, with a probability
greater than 1/2, that player I (II) receives at most P (P' ).
I	 II
A similar verification can be given for the case of vindictive player
I (II) having a fully marked column and protective player II (I) not having
a fully marked row.
I
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